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INTRODUCTION 
Using direct democracy, voters in a majority of states have 
considered, in recent years, whether the definition of marriage 
should include or exclude same-sex couples. This Article explores 
how individuals assessed three ballot measures that defined 
marriage in three states: two constitutional referendums that 
proposed to outlaw same-sex marriage in North Carolina and 
Minnesota, and a veto referendum that asked voters to affirm a 
legislative action that legalized same-sex marriage in 
Washington state. We explore what individuals knew about the 
referendums and whether elite endorsements helped them make 
what Lupia and McCubbins termed “reasoned choices” on these 
ballot measures.1 We find that, despite the simplicity of the 
measures, knowledge about them was generally poor. We also 
show that individuals sometimes, but by no means universally, 
use elite endorsements to inform their decisions. When 
individuals use elite endorsements, the individual must perceive 
the cue-giver to be knowledgeable and trustworthy. We also 
discover knowing a gay or lesbian person is sometimes related to 
voters’ decisions about whether to support or oppose same-sex 
marriage. Our results have broad implications for how 
individuals form their evaluations of social policy in the United 
States and how these evaluations translate into votes. We 
conclude by considering what our findings mean for direct 
democracy from both a legal and policy perspective.  
Since 1998, voters in thirty-six states have considered the 
question of whether to outlaw or allow same-sex couples to marry 
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 1 See generally ARTHUR LUPIA & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE DEMOCRATIC 
DILEMMA: CAN CITIZENS LEARN WHAT THEY NEED TO KNOW? (James E. Alt & Douglass C. 
North eds., 1998) [hereinafter LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA]. 
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a total of forty times.2 Until the 2012 elections in Maine, 
Maryland, and Washington, citizens had not yet voted to legalize 
same-sex marriage at the ballot box. In June 2015, the United 
States Supreme Court decided in Obergefell v. Hodges that bans 
on same-sex marriage are unconstitutional.3 While the basic 
right of same-sex marriage is now decided, issues related to 
same-sex marriage as a social policy—for example, whether 
public figures can opt out of performing marriages based on their 
religious beliefs or whether businesses must cater to same-sex 
couples—will continue to be matters considered both in the 
courts and on the ballot. Despite the often-contentious nature of 
the issue—and the sometimes astronomical spending for or 
against these measures—research using individual-level data to 
analyze how individuals make decisions concerning same-sex 
marriage is limited.  
In what represents some of the only individual-level data 
that explores how voters decided these social policy questions, 
our previous research on same-sex marriage4 examines an exit 
survey of California voters regarding Proposition 8—the highly 
contentious and notably expensive constitutional amendment 
banning same-sex marriage in California that was later 
overturned by the United States Supreme Court.5 Our results 
reveal that most voters knew very little about the measure. 
Those who knew and trusted one of the political parties’ 
endorsements, however, were likely to use that cue to arrive at a 
decision. This finding supports the theory of persuasion, 
learning, and choice that Lupia and McCubbins proposed.6 By 
contrast, voters’ knowledge of specific facts about the measure 
had a negligible effect on their decisions.  
Our previous results, while novel and interesting, suffer 
from a relatively small sample size.7 Moreover, due to the exit 
 
 2 Two states—Arizona and California—considered outlawing marriage twice; Maine 
rejected a law via referendum to allow same-sex marriage, but then passed an initiative 
to legalize same-sex marriage. H.R. 1860, 125th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2012). Nevada’s 
constitution dictates that voters must consider (and pass) any constitutional change in 
two subsequent elections. NEV. CONST. art. 19, § 2.  
 3 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 4 For our analysis on voting behavior on California’s Proposition 8 in 2008, see 
generally Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box: Perception 
of Ballot Measures Regarding Same-Sex Marriage and Abortion in California, 34 J. PUB. 
POL’Y 3 (2014) [hereinafter Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box]. 
 5 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013). 
 6 For a formal explanation of their model and expectations, see LUPIA 
& MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 17–39.  
 7 See Craig M. Burnett, Elizabeth Garrett, & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dilemma 
of Direct Democracy, 9 ELECTION L.J.: RULES, POL., & POL’Y 305, 305–14 (2010) 
[hereinafter Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy] (analyzing voting behavior on 
California’s Proposition 7, showing that usage of cues is quite limited); see also Burnett 
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survey format of these studies, we were unable to ask more than 
a few questions about the ballot measures we surveyed. Indeed, 
our research on Proposition 8 likely raises more questions than 
answers,8 including:  
1. How often do voters use endorsements to arrive at an 
informed decision on ballot measures? 
2. Is our finding that knowledge of facts has a limited impact 
on decisions idiosyncratic to Proposition 8, or is this a 
general finding? 
3. Given the relatively low levels of knowledge about policy 
specifics and endorsements, how do the majority of voters 
arrive at decisions? 
While we cannot definitively approach an answer to the third 
question, we endeavor to provide some analysis on the other two 
questions with additional data. Using survey data from three 
states that considered outlawing or adopting same-sex marriage 
during the 2012 election cycle, we again examine the degree to 
which individuals’ knowledge of prominent endorsements and 
pertinent policy facts influence their decisions. Taking our lead 
from Lupia,9 and his work with McCubbins,10 we explore the 
hypothesis that individuals use information to arrive at a 
reasoned decision. Unlike our previous research, we have 
gathered significantly more in-depth data to provide greater 
insight into how voters make decisions about whether to legalize 
or outlaw same-sex marriage in their state. As in our previous 
research, we find that individuals do not use cues from 
prominent third-party endorsers at a high rate. We also show 
that factual knowledge has a limited effect on decisions.  
We argue that the results we present here represent a 
unique and instructive test case of the Lupia and McCubbins 
hypothesis, as same-sex marriage is the prototypical “easy issue” 
for which most individuals can arrive at a decision armed with 
little more than their gut instinct.11 In other words, we expect 
 
& McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 11 (finding wide recognition of 
Governor Schwarzenegger’s endorsement in a study of several Indian gaming compacts); 
Craig M. Burnett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Common Wisdom Is Neither Common 
nor Wisdom: Exploring Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements on Three Ballot Measures, 97 
MINN. L. REV. 1557, 1561–69 (2013) [hereinafter Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited 
Use of Endorsements].  
 8 Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 10–12. 
 9 See generally Arthur Lupia, Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and 
Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 63 (1994) 
[hereinafter Lupia, Shortcuts] (showing that voters make reasonably informed decisions 
on insurance reform initiatives). 
 10 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 35–38.  
 11 For what constitutes an “easy issue,” see Edward G. Carmines & James A. 
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that same-sex marriage is the least likely place to find support 
for the Lupia and McCubbins hypothesis.12 In addition to 
estimating the effect of endorsements and facts, we also provide 
some traction on the third question by gauging the effect that 
personal relationships have on decisions. In particular, we find 
that knowing a gay or lesbian person can have a large effect on 
the individuals’ decision calculus.  
Not only do these findings have both important normative 
and legal implications, we suspect that our results will be 
informative regarding how voters will behave on related issues in 
future elections. That is, while the basic policy of marriage is 
decided, it is likely that same-sex marriage will follow a similar 
policy path that abortion did post Roe v. Wade.13 The battle of 
same-sex marriage will likely shift to the policy margins, as 
citizens, interest groups, and legislatures will attempt to shape 
and reshape the boundaries of same-sex marriage as a policy. 
I. VOTERS AND DECISION MAKING ON BALLOT MEASURES 
Whether voters are equipped with the ability to make 
political decisions in both representative and direct democracy 
has been a subject of considerable debate among scholars and 
political observers. For representative democracy, Converse’s 
study of belief systems highlights the fact that most individuals 
do not organize the world in terms of a liberal or conservative 
ideology, and most individuals lack a meaningful understanding 
of the ideological spectrum.14 The impact of Converse’s study 
cannot be understated, as it became common wisdom that the 
average voter’s inability to recall specific facts implies voters are 
unprepared to make democratic decisions. Subsequent studies on 
what voters know about politics have served to reinforce this 
belief.15 
In response to Converse’s findings, scholars interested in 
voter decision making approached the question of competence 
from a more practical vantage point. Notably, Brady and 
Sniderman constructed a framework for understanding voters’ 
 
Stimson, The Two Faces of Issue Voting, 74 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 78, 80 (1980).  
 12 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 205–08.  
 13 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 14 Philip E. Converse, The Ideological Character of Mass Participation in American 
Politics, in POLITICAL ISSUES AND BUSINESS IN 1964, at 11, 15 (Govert W. van den Bosch 
ed., 1964) (finding that voters lack a strong understanding of the political world in a deep 
analysis of American National Election Study data). 
 15 For a summary of what voters know about politics, see MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI 
& SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 
(1996). 
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decisions that differed substantially from Converse.16 They argue 
that most individuals will rely on basic feelings of groups to help 
them arrive at a decision, which they termed “likability 
heuristics.” Their argument is that storing and recalling vast 
amounts of knowledge to make a decision is often too difficult for 
most individuals. Instead, basic feelings of like or dislike for a 
group or person often lead to similar decisions as if the individual 
were more informed. 
Similar to Downs,17 Popkin’s classic work on heuristics 
argues that simple cues—and especially party identification—
help voters arrive at a relatively informed decision without 
investing much time or effort.18 Popkin argues that voters choose 
to minimize the time required to arrive at a decision, but still 
make decisions that are not all that different from a 
fully-informed vote.19 Empirically, it is Lupia’s seminal research 
on voters in Los Angeles during the 1988 general election that 
examines this theory with survey data.20 Lupia’s survey shows 
that voters who were aware of simple endorsements were able to 
arrive at decisions that were indistinguishable from those who 
were the most informed. 
While the public’s use of party identification was largely a 
foregone conclusion, Lupia’s results demonstrate that voters’ use 
of cues beyond party identification is possible. Expanding on this 
finding, Lupia and McCubbins identify the conditions under 
which the significant result seen in Lupia can appear.21 Lupia 
and McCubbins define two necessary conditions for a third-party 
endorsement to be persuasive and demonstrate the conditionality 
of persuasion in a novel set of laboratory experiments.22 First, an 
 
 16 See generally Henry E. Brady & Paul M. Sniderman, Attitude Attribution: A 
Group Basis for Political Reasoning, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1061 (1985) (theorizing that 
most individuals think about politics simplistically). 
 17 ANTHONY DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 211 (1957) (arguing that 
ignorance of specific facts is rational). 
 18 SAMUEL L. POPKIN, THE REASONING VOTER: COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION IN 
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. 1994) (expanding on the logic that ignorance is rational 
and party identification helps voters cast reasoned votes despite their ignorance of 
politics).  
 19 Id. at 7–15.  
 20 Lupia, Shortcuts, supra note 9, at 63, 72.  
 21 Id.; LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 98.  
 22 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 98. For additional 
experimental research on this topic which confirms the Lupia and McCubbins finding, see 
Cheryl Boudreau, Closing the Gap: When Do Cues Eliminate Differences Between 
Sophisticated and Unsophisticated Citizens?, 71 J. POL. 964 (2009); Cheryl Boudreau, 
Mathew D. McCubbins & Seana Coulson, Knowing When to Trust Others: An ERP Study 
of Decision Making After Receiving Information from Unknown People, 4 SOC. COGNITIVE 
& AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 23 (2009) [hereinafter Boudreau et al., ERP Study]; Mathew 
D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, When Does Deliberating Improve Decisionmaking?, 
15 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 9 (2006). For experimental results that match the Lupia 
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individual must trust the cue-giver in order for an endorsement 
to be persuasive. There are four requirements, which are 
individually or jointly sufficient, for an individual who receives 
an endorsement to trust the endorser.23 One means by which 
someone trusts the statements made by someone else (who is a 
stranger to them), is the Aristotelian maxim that the two are 
perceived by each other to share a common interest in the 
outcome of the individual’s choice. In terms of a vote on a ballot 
measure, the endorser and the voter must desire the same 
outcome. In the absence of a shared common interest, the 
endorser can establish trust by taking an observable and costly 
action to convey the information. Similarly, a penalty for lying or 
the threat of outside verification of the endorser’s statement can 
serve as external forces that substitute for the trust gained from 
common interest. 
The second condition is that the individual must perceive the 
endorser as being knowledgeable about the decision at hand. Put 
another way, if the endorser has no experience or knowledge that 
is pertinent to the choice available—e.g., the hardware salesman 
who is not particularly knowledgeable about cars offers his 
advice about which car to purchase—the individual receiving the 
endorsement will disregard the information as not useful. 
By establishing these two conditions for persuasion, Lupia 
and McCubbins make clear that a good number of endorsements 
will not be persuasive.24 Indeed, Garrett and McCubbins find 
that many third party endorsements fail to meet the two 
conditions for persuasion,25 and Garrett and Smith uncover the 
 
and McCubbins propositions, but do not test it directly, see generally GERD GIGERENZER, 
ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (Stephen Stich ed., 2000); GERD 
GIGERENZER, GUT FEELINGS: THE INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS (2007); GERD 
GIGERENZER, RATIONALITY FOR MORTALS: HOW PEOPLE COPE WITH UNCERTAINTY 
(Stephen Stich ed., 2008); GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US 
SMART (Stephen Stitch ed., 1999); GERD GIGERENZER & REINHARD SELTEN, BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX (2001). 
 23 Lupia and McCubbins state a prior necessary condition: individual decision 
makers must believe that they will learn something that enables them to improve the 
outcome resulting from their decision, or else they will not pay attention to the 
endorsement to begin with. Attention, and the belief that the decision maker can learn 
from the statement of another, is assumed away in all other analyses of persuasion and 
learning. LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 2. If, for example, 
the individual is already confident in her choice, she will not seek or incorporate an 
endorsement into her decision (more information is not always better, a new statement 
could be erroneous, or confusing, thus making the decision maker worse off). Id. For an 
experimental study of attention and persuasion, see Boudreau et al., ERP Study, supra 
note 22. 
 24 LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 7. 
 25 For an analysis of several cue-givers in direct democracy elections, see Elizabeth 
Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, When Voters Make Laws: How Direct Democracy Is 
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common practice of hiding the identity of the true endorsement 
with an ambiguous front group name.26 In our own research, we 
also call into question the degree to which voters use 
endorsements to make decisions on ballot measures.27 Our 
empirical findings are quite mixed, but consistent: endorsements 
are influential on some people for some endorsements, and 
knowledge of facts only matters some of the time.  
While our surveys have raised important questions about the 
degree to which voters actually use endorsements or knowledge 
of facts, the results we have presented to date are still limited. 
Our goal here is to expand on the empirical record concerning 
both cues and factual information and how voters process 
knowledge into decisions. The policy area we study is whether an 
individual chooses to adopt or ban same-sex marriage—a policy 
we have examined before.28 In addition to providing new data, we 
ask more in-depth questions about what kinds of policy facts and 
prominent endorsements individuals learn about, allowing us to 
gauge what individuals know about these referendums that will 
appear on their ballots just days later. We also include a measure 
of whether or not they know a gay or lesbian person.  
Unlike our previous research that examines other policy 
areas, same-sex marriage is a relatively inhospitable 
environment to look for the Lupia and McCubbins hypothesis to 
have predictive power. Same-sex marriage is an archetypal “easy 
issue” under the Carmines and Stimson framework.29 Same-sex 
marriage has been on the political agenda for over fifteen years 
and focuses on the ends, rather than the means. Thus, voters 
who must consider these types of issues often have well-formed 
opinions about the matter and can rely on a “gut reaction” to the 
policy. Because easy issues, such as same-sex marriage 
measures, typically do not require much in the way of policy 
specifics, providing a reasoned answer often means the voter 
needs “no conceptual sophistication.”30 For the Lupia and 
McCubbins framework, we would predict that endorsements are 
likely less persuasive. Many individuals will already have made 
 
Shaping American Cities, 13 PUB. WORKS MGMT. & POL’Y 39 (2008). 
 26 See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors and Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295 (2005) (revealing, in an 
examination of several groups listed in official support or opposition of ballot measures, 
that most groups were constructed for just the one election and the names chosen were 
largely uninformative, if not misleading). 
 27 See Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7; Burnett 
&  McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4; Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ 
Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at 1561.  
 28 Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 3, 10–12. 
 29 Carmines & Stimson, supra note 11, at 78. 
 30 Id. 
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up their minds about the issue and, therefore, are not seeking 
knowledge from an endorsement. Under these conditions, 
endorsements will only be persuasive for a fraction of the 
population. 
In this research, we test two hypotheses that we derive from 
the Lupia and McCubbins framework that sets parameters for 
when third-party endorsements will be persuasive.31 Similar to 
our previous research, we operationalize common interest—
which establishes trust—between an endorser and an individual 
as being satisfied when the individual has a positive perception 
of the endorser.32 We establish the knowledgeability condition by 
only examining endorsers who have considerable expertise on the 
question at hand.33 Consistent with the Lupia and McCubbins 
framework, we explore the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who share a common 
interest with a cue-giver will be more likely to accept the 
cue-giver’s endorsement and vote in accordance with 
that recommendation. 
We also use the Lupia and McCubbins framework to derive a 
second hypothesis about how third-party endorsements can 
influence voters. In particular, we agree with Lupia and 
McCubbins that an individual does not need to have a positive 
perception of the endorser to extract information from an 
endorsement. Indeed, Lupia and McCubbins argue that 
sometimes the most informative endorsement comes from 
endorsers with whom an individual disagrees.34 In other words, 
an individual can use the recommendation from an endorser they 
disagree with to learn to do the opposite, as they do not share a 
common interest. Accordingly, our second hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are aware that they do 
not share a common interest with a cue-giver will be 
more likely to use the cue-giver’s endorsement and vote 
in opposition to that recommendation. 
We also examine two other relationships with our data. 
First, similar to Lupia and others, we investigate whether 
greater knowledge has an impact on an individual’s decision.35 In 
 
 31 See LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1, at 9. 
 32 Burnett & McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 10–11. 
 33 We discuss this in further detail for each endorsement in the next section. See 
infra Part II. 
 34 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1.  
 35 See Lupia, Shortcuts, supra note 9, at 72. For an example of how increased 
information can alter voting choices, see Larry M. Bartels, Uninformed Votes: Information 
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our research, we focus on whether factual knowledge of policy 
specifics influences an individual’s decision. Second, we explore 
the degree to which personal relationships affect an individual’s 
belief that same-sex marriage should be legal or not. Here, the 
personal relationship we focus on is whether an individual knows 
a gay or lesbian person. We do not define these two explorations 
as formal hypotheses to test because, as we outline next, we 
perceive these two variables to be covariates in our model, not 
treatments. 
II. RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA 
We examine our hypotheses using data we collected during 
the 2012 election cycle. During the 2012 primary season, we 
polled eligible voters in North Carolina about Amendment 1—a 
legislatively-referred constitutional amendment that proposed to 
outlaw same-sex marriage in the state.36 In the general election, 
we asked registered voters in Minnesota and Washington about a 
referendum in their respective state concerning same-sex 
marriage. Minnesota’s Amendment 1 was a legislatively-referred 
constitutional amendment that proposed to outlaw same-sex 
marriage in the state.37 Washington’s Referendum 74 was a veto 
referendum38 of a legislative statute that legalized same-sex 
marriages.39 Thus, for North Carolina and Minnesota, voters in 
these states were considering an amendment to the constitution 
that would outlaw same-sex marriage; all constitutional 
amendments in these states require voter approval.40 As a veto 
referendum, Washington’s measure was citizen-initiated, in that 
individuals gathered enough signatures to require the duly 
passed legislation (a regular statute) authorizing same-sex 
marriages to appear on the ballot for voter approval before being 
enacted.41 
We use a post-test-only non-equivalent group design to 
explore our two hypotheses based on the Lupia and McCubbins 
 
Effects in Presidential Elections, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 194 (1996). 
 36 North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/North_Carolina_Same-Sex_Marriage,_Amendment_1_(May_2012) 
[http://perma.cc/FH4J-V3EN]. 
 37 Minnesota Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/Minnesota_Same-Sex_Marriage_Amendment,_Amendment_1_(2012) 
[https://perma.cc/WYR4-6VRF]. 
 38 This may also be called a popular referendum. 
 39 Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012), 
BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Washington_Same-Sex_Marriage_Veto_Referendum,_ 
Referendum_74_(2012) [perma.cc/J5X9-WRYG]. 
 40 MINN. CONST. art. XI; N.C. CONST. art. XIII; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII.  
 41 See Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012), 
supra note 39. 
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model of when third-party endorsements will influence 
outcomes.42 In a basic sense, our treatment is knowledge of an 
endorsement. Knowledge of an endorsement, as we discussed 
previously, is not sufficient for persuasion by itself. For the 
endorsement to be persuasive, the individual must trust the 
endorser by sharing a common interest or knowing that they do 
not share a common interest (allowing for the individual to do the 
opposite of the recommendation). Here, similar to Karp and our 
own research, we establish trust between the individual and the 
endorser by accounting for the interaction between knowledge of 
an endorsement and the individual’s perception of the cue-giver 
(positive or negative).43 Our first hypothesis states that 
individuals who have knowledge of an endorsement and have a 
positive perception of the endorser will be more likely to follow 
the endorser’s suggestion in their vote choice. Likewise, our 
second hypothesis states that individuals who have knowledge of 
an endorsement but have a negative perception of the cue-giver 
will be less likely to follow the cue-giver’s recommendation. To 
model this relationship, we split our sample of respondents into 
two groups: individuals who have a positive view of the endorser 
and individuals who have a negative view of the endorser. 
Separating the two types of individuals allows us the most 
precise test of our hypotheses and minimizes the difference in 
propensity to receive the treatment between the two groups. In 
other words, if there is a difference in propensity to learn of an 
endorsement based on an individual’s perception of the cue-giver, 
we account for that variance by separating our respondents into 
separate groups. 
While we can account for the variance in the propensity to 
receive the endorsement between groups by creating subgroups, 
we still must account for the variance in propensity within 
groups. Since we have a non-equivalent group design, we must 
account for the discrepancies between the treatment group—i.e., 
learned of an endorsement—and the control group—i.e., did not 
learn of an endorsement. We use the empirical strategy we 
outlined in our previous research to construct equivalent 
groups.44 Specifically, we use the GenMatch package for R as 
implemented by MatchIt to construct equivalent treatment and 
 
 42 See generally LUPIA & MCCUBBINS, DEMOCRATIC DILEMMA, supra note 1. 
 43 See Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at 
1575; Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in 
CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 149 (Shaun Bowler 
et al. eds., 1998) (showing that impact of an endorsement depends on an individual’s 
evaluation of the endorser). 
 44 See Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7.  
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control groups.45 Matching is a useful tool to reduce the covariate 
imbalance between treatment and control groups. Unlike 
experimental work in which the researcher can use random 
assignment to achieve balance between the treatment and 
control groups, researchers conducting observational or 
quasi-experimental work have no control over the distribution of 
the treatment among groups. Indeed, there are sound reasons to 
expect that the treatment is not distributed evenly among the 
treatment and control group. In our research, we know that 
knowledge of endorsements is not randomly assigned to 
individuals: people who are more interested in politics, better 
educated, wealthier, and older are more likely to follow politics 
and, as a result, learn from endorsements. Matching, then, finds 
the best matches of individuals in the treatment group to the 
control group. In a more practical sense, the genetic matching 
algorithm produces a two-group sample of respondents who are 
as similar as possible along important covariates. Matching, 
combined with separating respondents into the two groups 
described in the previous paragraph, creates a balance in the 
propensity to receive the treatment for all relevant subgroups. In 
each of our matching algorithms, we use the following 
covariates:  age, income, education, gender, party identification, 
ideology, and political knowledge.46 
After constructing equivalent groups, we use a logit 
regression to estimate the effect of knowing an endorsement on 
vote choice. A formal representation of this regression appears in 
Equation 1. 
 
 
 45 For detailed descriptions on how GenMatch works, see Alexis Diamond & Jasjeet 
Sekhon, Genetic Matching for Estimating Causal Effects: A General Multivariate 
Matching Method for Achieving Balance in Observational Studies, 95 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
932 (2013); Jasjeet Sekhon, Opiates for the Matches: Matching Methods for Causal 
Inference, 12 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 487 (2009). MatchIt is a package in R that implements 
several matching algorithms. For a technical description of how to use the MatchIt 
package, see Daniel E. Ho et al., Matching as Nonparametric Preprocessing for Reducing 
Model Dependence in Parametric Causal Inference, 15 POL. ANALYSIS 199 (2007). 
 46 Political knowledge for North Carolina’s Amendment 1 is an index of the 
percentage of correct answers of the following six questions: (1) Whose responsibility is it 
to determine if a law is constitutional or not; (2) Do you happen to know what job or office 
Harry Reid currently holds; (3) How much of a majority of both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate are required to override a presidential veto; (4) Do you 
happen to know which party has the most members in the House of Representatives in 
Washington, D.C.; (5) Who is the current Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives; 
and (6) Who is the current Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court? For 
Minnesota’s Amendment 1 and Washington’s Referendum 74 there is an additional 
question in the index: Do you happen to know which party has the most members in the 
Senate in Washington, D.C.? 
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Equation 1 
Pr(yiz = 1) =  
1 
1+e
–(β0+β1Qiz+β2Xiz) 
In our logit regression, Pr(yiz = 1) represents the estimated 
probability an individual voting in favor of supporting a ballot 
measure; i denotes an individual in our survey; z represents the 
ballot measure being analyzed. A binary choice, “1” represents a 
“yes” vote and “0” is a “no” vote on ballot measure z. Next, Q is a 
matrix of dichotomous variables that signifies whether an 
individual had knowledge of an endorsement for ballot measure 
z. The model’s final term is X, which is a matrix of covariates 
that includes dichotomous variables identifying whether 
respondent i had knowledge of facts pertaining to ballot measure 
z and whether respondent i knows a gay or lesbian person. For a 
summary of our research design, see Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Research Design Summary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We fielded three surveys during the 2012 election cycle to 
examine our hypotheses. The first survey asked voting-eligible 
residents of North Carolina about Amendment 1, which appeared 
on the May 8 presidential primary ballot. To collect our sample of 
respondents, we hired Marketing Systems Group (MSG) to 
recruit voting eligible North Carolina residents and forward 
those individuals to our survey site.47 We received responses from 
1066 individuals during the time we were in the field, and our 
cooperation rate was 6%.48 
On this survey, we asked our respondents to report what 
they knew about Amendment 1, a legislatively-referred 
constitutional amendment that would codify the already existing 
statutory ban on same-sex marriage in the state’s constitution.49 
 
 47 Marketing Systems Group recruits respondents from their online opt-in panel. 
Online opt-in panels are discussed at length in the literature concerning survey sampling; 
we argue that most samples will be biased in some way. Additionally, since we are using a 
quasi-experimental design, we minimize the problem of selection bias. However, Appendix A 
contains the demographics for each sample compared to relevant U.S. census statistics. 
 48 Time in the field was from April 27 to May 3, 2012. 
 49 See North Carolina Same-Sex Marriage, Amendment 1 (May 2012), supra note 36. 
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Many individuals voiced their support or opposition to the 
measure. Of note, both President Barack Obama and 
then-Governor Beverly Perdue expressed opposition to the 
amendment. In addition to these two identification questions, we 
also asked respondents to indicate whether they approved or 
disapproved of President Obama’s and Governor Perdue’s job 
performance (two separate questions). Finally, we asked 
respondents to identify a piece of factual information regarding 
Amendment 1: whether our respondents understood that 
same-sex marriage was already prohibited in North Carolina.50 
This question serves as a covariate in our regression model. 
Our second survey asked registered voters in Minnesota 
about Amendment 1, a legislatively-referred constitutional ban 
on same-sex marriage that appeared on the 2012 general election 
ballot.51 As before, we used MSG to provide a sample of 
registered voters in Minnesota. We collected survey responses 
from October 31 to November 5, receiving a total of 1250 
responses. The cooperation rate was 7%. 
On this survey, we asked respondents to report whether they 
knew the positions of some of the most prominent third-party 
endorsements relating to Minnesota’s Amendment 1. In 
particular, we asked our respondents to identify the positions of 
President Barack Obama (opposed), Governor Mark Dayton 
(opposed), and Congresswoman Michele Bachmann (supported). 
We also asked respondents to indicate whether respondents had 
a positive or negative view of these cue-givers. For this measure, 
we assessed respondents’ knowledge about three facts relating to 
Amendment 1: (1) Amendment 1 left open the possibility for civil 
unions; (2) same-sex marriages were already prohibited by the 
state; and (3) the Minnesota Legislature had considered 
proposing a similar measure previously. A full list of these 
questions is available in Appendix B. 
The third survey asked registered voters in Washington 
state about Referendum 74, a veto referendum that proposed to 
legalize same-sex marriage in the state on the November 6, 2012 
general election ballot, where a yes vote constituted a vote to 
approve same-sex marriage.52 For this sample, we again used 
MSG and collected responses from registered voters in the state 
from October 31 to November 5. We received responses from 1285 
registered voters in Washington with a response rate of 7%. 
 
 50 See Appendix B. 
 51 The date of the general election ballot was November 6, 2012. See Minnesota 
Same-Sex Marriage Amendment, Amendment 1 (2012), supra note 37. 
 52 See Washington Same-Sex Marriage Veto Referendum, Referendum 74 (2012), 
supra note 39. 
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Similar to questions regarding the Minnesota measure, we 
asked respondents to identify the positions of three third-party 
endorsements: Washington State Democrats (supported); Jeff 
Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, a major employer in the state 
(supported); and the National Organization for Marriage 
(opposed). As was the case with the other measures, we asked 
respondents to indicate whether they had a positive or negative 
assessment of each cue-giver. In addition, we asked respondents 
to report their knowledge of three facts pertaining to Referendum 
74: (1) same-sex couples were not allowed to marry in 
Washington state; (2) if passed, the majority of domestic 
partnerships would convert to marriages; and (3) there was no 
exemption for religious organizations who accepted state money 
from being required to provide various services to same-sex 
couples, such as adoption (but excluding marriages). Again, a full 
description of each question is available in Appendix B. 
For each of the three ballot measures, we also asked 
respondents to indicate whether they knew a gay or lesbian 
person. Specifically, we asked: “Do you have any friends or 
relatives or coworkers who have told you, personally, that they 
are gay or lesbian?” This variable is similar to our measures of 
knowledge about the ballot measure, since it acts as a covariate 
in our model. Additionally, including this measure allows us to 
examine whether contact with a gay or lesbian person continues 
to have an impact on vote choice. We turn now to present our 
results. 
III. RESULTS 
The first step in our results is to present the percentage of 
correct answers to each of the knowledge questions and the 
distribution of responses for knowing a gay or lesbian person for 
each of the three samples. As Table 1 shows, knowledge of cues 
and facts varied across the three surveys. For North Carolina’s 
Amendment 1, only 36.5% of respondents were aware of 
President Obama’s opposition, and only 42.6% were aware of 
then-Governor Perdue’s opposition to the measure. Notably, 
72.2% of respondents knew the status quo, that same-sex 
marriages were already illegal in the state. Lastly, just over 70% 
of respondents reported having been informed personally by 
someone close to them that he or she was a gay person or a 
lesbian. 
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Table 1: Percentage of Correct Responses to Endorsement and Factual 
Knowledge Questions and Knowing a Gay or Lesbian Person 
 
Question Description Ballot Measure % Correct 
North Carolina 
President Obama Opposed  
(Cue) 
Governor Beverly Perdue Opposed 
(Cue) 
NC Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage 
Already (Fact) 
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person 
(Covariate) 
 
Amendment 1  
(NC, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(NC, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(NC, 2012) 
Amendment 1 
(NC, 2012) 
 
36.5 
 
42.6 
 
72.2 
 
70.3 
 
Minnesota 
President Obama Opposed  
(Cue) 
Governor Mark Dayton Opposed  
(Cue) 
Representative Michele Bachmann 
Supported (Cue) 
MN Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage 
Already (Fact) 
Leaves Open Possibility of Civil 
Unions (Fact) 
Considered Similar Measure Before 
(Fact) 
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person 
(Covariate) 
 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
Amendment 1  
(MN, 2012) 
 
44.2 
 
48.4 
 
50.2 
 
77.6 
 
38.5 
 
29.5 
 
70.6 
Washington 
Washington State Democrats  
(Cue) 
Jeff Bezos Supported  
(Cue) 
National Organization for Marriage 
(Cue) 
WA Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage 
Already (Fact) 
Domestic Partnerships Convert to 
Marriages (Fact) 
No Exemption for Religious 
Organizations (Fact) 
Knows a Gay or Lesbian Person 
(Covariate) 
 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
Referendum 74 
(WA, 2012) 
 
62.3 
 
32.1 
 
40.3 
 
77.6 
 
29 
 
24.6 
 
74.6 
Note: We calculate the percentage of correct responses to these questions based on the respondents who 
are eligible for regression analysis before matching. The sample sizes are as follows: North Carolina 
N=561, Minnesota N=684, Washington N=700. 
Regarding Minnesota’s Amendment 1, knowledge of the cues 
we asked about varied from 44.2% for President Obama’s 
opposition to 50.1% identifying Representative Michele 
Bachmann’s support of the amendment, while 48.4% identified 
Governor Dayton as an opponent. As was the case with North 
Carolina, a large majority of respondents knew the status quo 
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policy—that Minnesota law already prohibited same-sex 
marriages.53 The two other facts in our survey did not fare as 
well: only 38.5% understood that the legislation left open the 
possibility of civil unions and just 29.5% were aware that the 
Legislature had considered proposing a similar measure recently. 
Almost identical to North Carolina, we find that 70.6% of 
respondents have had someone close to them inform them 
personally that he or she is a gay person or a lesbian. 
For Washington, knowledge of cues also varies. A majority54 
of respondents were aware of the Washington State Democrats’ 
support of Referendum 74,55 but only 32.1% were aware of 
Amazon.com CEO Jeff Bezos’s support for the measure. Likewise, 
40.3% of the Washington respondents knew that the National 
Organization for Marriage opposed the measure. As before, the 
status quo—that Washington did not allow same-sex couples to 
marry—was widely known.56 Knowledge of other facts, however, 
was quite low, with just 29% and 24.6% of respondents reporting 
correctly that most domestic partnerships would convert to 
marriages and that the law did not provide exemptions for 
religious organizations to not be required to serve same-sex 
couples (with the exception of marriage ceremonies), respectively. 
As was the case in both North Carolina and Minnesota, a large 
majority of respondents report having a close relative or friend 
who identifies himself or herself as a gay person or lesbian.57  
Next, we turn to analyze whether knowledge of cues have an 
impact on individuals’ decisions on ballot measures that consider 
same-sex marriage as a policy outcome. First, we present the 
results of our matching algorithm. While the full output 
associated with our matching results is far too large to publish, 
we present the overall improvement in propensity scores 
achieved through our genetic matching algorithm in Table 2. The 
first column of the table reports the difference in means for the 
propensity to receive the treatment between the treatment and 
control groups. That is, column one is the pre-matching mean 
propensity of the treatment minus the pre-matching mean 
propensity of the control group. The second column is the same 
comparison in mean propensity scores post matching. The third 
column is a calculation of the percent of propensity score 
improvement.  
 
 
 53 77.6% correct. See supra Table 1. 
 54 62.3%. See id. 
 55 Referendum 74 legalizes same-sex marriage. See id. 
 56 77.6 % correct. See id. 
 57 74.6%. See id. 
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Table 2: Propensity Score Balance Before and  
After Genetic Matching 
Matched Treatment 
Condition 
Mean 
Propensity 
Difference Pre 
Mean 
Propensity 
Difference Post 
Percent 
Improvement 
NC Amendment 1,  
Approve Obama 
NC Amendment 1,  
Disapprove Obama 
NC Amendment 1,  
Approve Perdue 
NC Amendment 1,  
Disapprove Perdue 
MN Amendment 1,  
Negative Opinion Bachmann 
MN Amendment 1,  
Approve Obama 
MN Amendment 1,  
Disapprove Obama 
MN Amendment 1,  
Approve Dayton 
MN Amendment 1,  
Disapprove Dayton 
WA Referendum 74,  
Positive Opinion Bezos 
WA Referendum 74,  
Positive Opinion WA Dems. 
WA Referendum 74,  
Negative Opinion WA Dems. 
WA Referendum 74,  
Negative Opinion N.O.M. 
0.058 
 
0.068 
 
0.171 
 
0.065 
 
0.219 
 
0.139 
 
0.133 
 
0.275 
 
0.290 
 
0.134 
 
0.120 
 
0.199 
 
0.358 
0.002 
 
0.000 
 
0.005 
 
0.004 
 
0.003 
 
0.001 
 
0.000 
 
0.012 
 
0.006 
 
0.003 
 
0.005 
 
0.003 
 
0.018 
97.2 
 
95.7 
 
97.0 
 
94.2 
 
98.8 
 
99.3 
 
99.8 
 
95.7 
 
97.9 
 
98.0 
 
95.5 
 
98.6 
 
95.7 
 
As Table 2 shows, each of the subgroups we matched saw a 
marked improvement in propensity score balance between the 
treatment and control groups. As an example, consider the 
improvement in North Carolina’s Amendment 1 for individuals 
who gave a positive job evaluation to President Obama. Before 
matching, respondents who received the treatment—i.e., they 
were aware that President Obama opposed the amendment—
were 5.8 percentage points more likely to receive the treatment 
based on the matching algorithm we used.58 After matching, the 
difference in propensity to receive the treatment between the 
treatment and control group dropped to 0.2 percentage points. In 
fact, this subgroup saw a 97.2% increase in propensity score 
balance between the treatment and control group after matching. 
While we refrain from discussing each of the propensity score 
improvements for each subgroup, it is worth noting that each 
subgroup experienced a substantial increase in propensity 
 
 58 See supra Part II for details on the algorithm. 
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balance after matching (the lowest improvement was 94%). 
Overall, Table 2 shows that our genetic matching algorithm 
produced a treatment group and control group that are directly 
comparable. 
With comparable groups, we calculate a series of regressions 
based on Equation 1. After each regression, we calculate some 
predicted probabilities of interest using Long and Freese’s SPost 
program (SPost is a program in Stata that easily calculates 
quantities of interest based on regression results 2005).59 Table 3 
presents the regression results for our matched samples of 
respondents who either approved or disapproved of President 
Obama’s job performance. For respondents who approved of his 
job performance, knowledge of President Obama’s opposition led 
individuals to vote against the measure at a higher rate—that is, 
they appeared to follow the advice of his endorsement. For 
respondents who disapproved of his job performance, knowledge 
of Obama’s opposition to the measure led them to do the opposite 
of his recommendation. In both cases, then, the treatment had a 
significant effect in the predicted direction. Notably, respondents 
in both subgroups who knew a gay or lesbian person were 
significantly less likely to support the measure.  
Table 3: Logit Regression Results of President Obama’s  
Endorsement on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 
 Approve Obama Disapprove Obama 
Knows Obama Opposed -0.94* 0.62* 
 (0.41) (0.27) 
SSM Prohibited -0.08 0.07 
 (0.48) (0.28) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person -1.63*** -1.11*** 
 (0.43) (0.31) 
Constant 0.65 0.83* 
 (0.57) (0.35) 
Pseudo-R2 .122 .057 
N 172 294 
Note: Dependent variable is support for North Carolina’s same-sex marriage ban 
(Amendment 1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for the 
regressions in Table 3. Holding the factual knowledge variable at 
its mean effect,60 we calculate four quantities of interest for 
North Carolina’s Amendment 1. What these probabilities show is 
 
 59 See generally J. SCOTT LONG & JEREMY FREESE, REGRESSION MODELS FOR 
CATEGORICAL DEPENDENT VARIABLES USING STATA (3d ed. 2014). 
 60 For all calculations of predicted probabilities, we hold the effects of factual 
knowledge at their mean values. 
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that knowledge of Obama’s opposition produced a 23 percentage 
point drop in support for the amendment among individuals who 
approve of his job performance; knowing both a gay or lesbian 
person and the cue lead to an additional decline of 29.2 
percentage points. Interestingly, just knowing a gay person or 
lesbian and not knowing the cue produces a voting rate that is 
statistically indistinguishable from respondents who approve of 
Obama’s job performance. For respondents who disapprove of 
Obama, patterns are similar: knowledge of the cue leads to an 
increase in support for the amendment, but knowing a gay or 
lesbian person leads to a substantial decline in support. 
Figure 2: Predicted Probabilities of President Obama’s Endorsement 
on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 (2012) 
 
Turning now to examine the effect of Governor Perdue’s 
opposition to the amendment, Table 4 reports that her 
endorsement only had an effect on individuals who disapproved 
of her job performance. That is, individuals who disapproved of 
her job performance as Governor but knew she opposed 
Amendment 1 were more likely to support the measure as a 
result. Governor Perdue’s endorsement did not have a significant 
effect on respondents who approved of her job performance, but 
the effect was in the expected direction. In both regressions, we 
again see a significant decline in support for the amendment 
among respondents who know a gay or lesbian friend or relative.  
 
 
 
Disapprove Obama Approve Obama 
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Table 4: Logit Regression Results of Governor Perdue’s  
Endorsement on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 
 Approve Perdue Disapprove Perdue 
Knows Perdue Opposed -0.24 0.63* 
 (0.46) (0.28) 
SSM Prohibited 1.00 0.22 
 (0.55) (0.29) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person -1.00* -1.07*** 
 (0.51) (0.31) 
Constant -0.69 0.43 
 (0.63) (0.34) 
Pseudo-R2 .05 .055 
N 128 287 
Note: Dependent variable is support for North Carolina’s same-sex marriage ban 
(Amendment 1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The predicted probabilities relevant for Governor Perdue, 
presented in Figure 3, highlight the effect of both the 
endorsement and knowing a gay or lesbian person. While 
knowledge of her endorsement had no discernable effect on 
respondents who approved of her job performance, knowing a gay 
person or lesbian leads to a decline in support for the measure by 
about 22 percentage points. For respondents who disapprove of 
her job performance, knowledge of her endorsement increases 
support for the measure by 13 percentage points, but knowing a 
gay person or lesbian decreases support for the measure by 23.5 
percentage points for individuals who know the cue and 26.1 
percentage points for those who do not. 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities of Governor Perdue’s Endorsement 
on North Carolina’s Amendment 1 (2012) 
Disapprove Perdue Approve Perdue 
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We begin our analysis of Minnesota’s Amendment 1 by 
examining the effect of Representative Bachmann’s support for 
the measure. Unfortunately, there were not enough respondents 
who reported a positive opinion of the Representative to analyze 
whether her endorsement had an effect on those respondents. 
Instead, Table 5 reports the regression results for just 
individuals who have a negative opinion of Representative 
Bachmann. The regression shows clearly that knowing that 
Representative Bachmann supported the measure was helpful 
for this subgroup as they were less likely to support the 
amendment. Interestingly, knowing that the law left open the 
possibility of civil unions led to an increase in support for the 
measure. Unlike North Carolina, however, knowing a gay or 
lesbian friend or relative did not have a substantial effect on this 
subgroup. The predicted probabilities associated with this 
regression, available in Figure 4, show that the effect of knowing 
her endorsement led to a substantial drop in support for the 
amendment of at least 16 percentage points. 
Table 5: Logit Regression Results of Representative Bachmann’s 
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 
 Negative Opinion of Bachmann 
Bachmann Supported -1.17*** 
 (0.35) 
Civil Unions Possible 1.04** 
 (0.35) 
SSM Prohibited 0.36 
 (0.39) 
Considered Ban Previously -0.81 
 (0.42) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person -0.54 
 (0.35) 
Constant -0.84 
 (0.44) 
Pseudo-R2 .107 
N 378 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment 
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Figure 4: Predicted Probabilities of Representative Bachmann’s 
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012) 
 
Table 6 contains the regression results for President 
Obama’s endorsement. Unlike North Carolina, President 
Obama’s opposition to Minnesota’s Amendment 1 only had an 
effect on respondents who disapproved of the President’s job 
performance: respondents aware of this cue were significantly 
more likely to support the measure, as our second hypothesis 
predicts. As was the case with Representative Bachmann, 
knowing a gay or lesbian friend or relative has no discernable 
 
Table 6: Logit Regression Results of President Obama’s  
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 
 Approve Obama Disapprove Obama 
Obama Opposed -0.07 1.33*** 
 (0.36) (0.35) 
Civil Unions Possible 0.50 -0.21 
 (0.37) (0.34) 
SSM Prohibited -0.02 -0.63 
 (0.42) (0.46) 
Considered Ban Previously 0.12 0.28 
 (0.38) (0.45) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person -0.55 -0.25 
 (0.40) (0.35) 
Constant -1.80*** 1.25* 
 (0.51) (0.53) 
Pseudo-R2 .017 .077 
N 300 310 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment 
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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effect on our respondents in either subgroup. Figure 5, which 
presents the predicted probabilities, shows that there is 
essentially no difference in voting rates among respondents who 
approve of the President’s job performance. For respondents who 
disapprove of his job performance, however, knowing his 
endorsement leads to at least a 21.2 percentage point increase in 
support for the measure. 
Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities of President Obama’s Endorsement 
on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012) 
 
Table 7 presents the regression results related to Governor 
Dayton’s endorsement. The results for Governor Dayton are the 
exact opposite of President Obama’s: individuals who approve of 
Governor Dayton’s job performance and knew of his opposition to 
the measure were significantly less likely to support Amendment 1. 
Also, similar to the results for Representative Bachmann, 
respondents in this subgroup who knew that the measure left 
open the possibility of civil unions were more likely to support 
the measure. By contrast, there were no significant results for 
respondents who disapproved of Governor Dayton’s job 
performance. Identical to the previous two sets of regression 
results, knowing a gay person or lesbian had no effect on vote 
intention for Minnesota’s Amendment 1. The predicted 
probabilities we generate from this regression, available in 
Figure 6, show that knowledge of the cue among respondents 
who approve of Governor Dayton’s job performance lead to at 
least a 12.6 percentage point drop in support for the measure. 
There were no meaningful quantities of interest for respondents 
who disapproved of Governor Dayton’s job performance. 
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Table 7: Logit Regression Results of Governor Dayton’s  
Endorsement on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 
 Approve Dayton Disapprove Dayton 
Dayton Opposed -0.85* 0.66 
 (0.37) (0.47) 
Civil Unions Possible 0.87* 0.37 
 (0.34) (0.42) 
SSM Prohibited 0.42 -0.02 
 (0.42) (0.52) 
Considered Ban Previously 0.22 0.30 
 (0.35) (0.44) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person -0.19 -0.89 
 (0.37) (0.57) 
Constant -1.56*** 1.44* 
 (0.47) (0.62) 
Pseudo-R2 .053 .053 
N 303 177 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Minnesota’s same-sex marriage ban (Amendment 
1 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Figure 6: Predicted Probabilities of Governor Dayton’s Endorsement 
on Minnesota’s Amendment 1 (2012) 
 
The final measure we surveyed about is Washington’s 
Referendum 74. First, we examine the effect of Jeff Bezos’ 
support of the referendum. The regression results for individuals 
who have a positive opinion of Bezos are available in Table 8.61 
 
 61 There were not enough respondents who had a negative opinion of Bezos to run a 
regression. 
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The results show that Jeff Bezos had no effect on vote intention. 
This is perhaps expected, as Bezos is not a policy expert. The 
predicted probabilities in Figure 7 reflect the null results seen in 
Table 8. 
Table 8: Logit Regression Results of Jeff Bezos’s Endorsement on 
Washington’s Referendum 74 
 Positive Opinion of Bezos 
Bezos Supported 0.14 
 (0.38) 
SSM Prohibited 0.15 
 (0.44) 
Civil Unions Convert -0.49 
 (0.38) 
No Religious Exemptions -0.28 
 (0.46) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person 0.80 
 (0.42) 
Constant 0.81 
 (0.59) 
Pseudo-R2 .03 
N 210 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages 
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Figure 7: Predicted Probabilities of Jeff Bezos’s Endorsement on 
Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012) 
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Next, we examine the effect of the Washington State 
Democrats’ endorsement on individuals’ vote choice. As Table 9 
shows, the effect of their support for the referendum was 
statistically indistinguishable for both respondents who have a 
positive or negative opinion of the party. That is, the treatment of 
an endorsement from the Washington State Democrats has no 
effect on respondents’ intended vote choice. For respondents with 
a positive view of the Washington State Democrats, knowing a 
gay or lesbian relative or friend had a significant and positive 
effect on voting for the referendum (i.e., supporting same-sex 
marriage). For those who have a negative view, knowing that the 
referendum did not provide exemptions for religious 
organizations for activities other than marriage led to a 
significant and negative effect on support for the measure. For 
the predicted probabilities in Figure 8, the only interesting 
calculation is that knowing a gay person or lesbian increases 
support for the referendum by about 12.6 percentage points for 
respondents who have a positive opinion of the Washington State 
Democrats. 
Table 9: Logit Regression Results of Washington State Democrats 
Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 
 Positive Opinion of  
WA Democrats 
Negative Opinion of  
WA Democrats 
WA Democrats Supported 0.83 -0.58 
 (0.45) (0.45) 
SSM Prohibited 0.22 -0.01 
 (0.44) (0.43) 
Civil Unions Convert -0.44 -0.37 
 (0.40) (0.42) 
No Religious Exemptions -0.25 -1.47* 
 (0.44) (0.72) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person 1.22** 0.56 
 (0.41) (0.44) 
Constant 0.62 -1.17* 
 (0.45) (0.50) 
Pseudo-R2 .071 .066 
N 324 245 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages 
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:30 AM 
2016] Marriage on the Ballot 27 
 
Figure 8: Predicted Probabilities of Washington State Democrats’ 
Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012) 
 
 
 
Finally, we present the results related to the National 
Organization for Marriage’s endorsement. While there were not 
enough respondents who had a positive view of the organization 
to run a regression, the results for respondents who had a 
negative opinion of the group are available in Table 10. Unlike 
the previous two endorsements that had no effect, individuals 
who were both aware of the National Organization for Marriage’s 
opposition to Referendum 74 and held a negative view of the 
group were significantly more likely to vote for the referendum. 
This result supports our second hypothesis. Also of note, 
individuals who knew a gay person or lesbian were significantly 
more likely to support the measure. The predicted probabilities, 
presented in Figure 9, are impressive as well: knowledge of the 
endorsement leads to a 57.8 percentage point increase in support, 
and knowing a gay person or lesbian increased that support by 
an additional 17.6 percentage points. In fact, just knowing a gay 
or lesbian friend or relative increases the probability of 
supporting the measure by 51.2 percentage points. 
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Table 10: Logit Regression Results of National Organization for 
Marriage’s Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 
 Negative Opinion of the National  
Organization for Marriage 
National Organization for Marriage Opposed 2.64*** 
 (0.73) 
SSM Prohibited -0.96 
 (0.78) 
Civil Unions Convert 1.01 
 (0.67) 
No Religious Exemptions -0.90 
 (0.70) 
Knows Gay or Lesbian Person 2.27*** 
 (0.63) 
Constant -0.58 
 (0.77) 
Pseudo-R2 .271 
N 204 
Note: Dependent variable is support for Washington’s legalization of same-sex marriages 
(Referendum 74 of 2012). * p<0.05, **p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Figure 9: Predicted Probabilities of the National Organization for 
Marriage’s Endorsement on Washington’s Referendum 74 (2012) 
 
CONCLUSION 
We analyzed whether cues from prominent third-party 
endorsers have an effect on individuals’ decisions on ballot 
measures related to same-sex marriage. Using the largest 
database of individual-level data collected on the topic to date, we 
used genetic matching to examine the hypothesis that knowledge 
of cues leads to improved decision making. We found that 
knowledge of a cue only sometimes influences individuals’ 
Do Not Delete 3/5/2016 11:30 AM 
2016] Marriage on the Ballot 29 
decisions: a cue was effective in seven of our thirteen cases. This 
result reinforces our interpretation that cues are influential some 
of the time for some voters. Indeed, there are substantial swaths 
of the electorate—i.e., those who do not have firm opinions of the 
cue-givers we analyzed—who are absent from our analysis. We 
also showed that knowing a gay or lesbian person sometimes has 
a substantial impact on an individual’s voting behavior.  
Similar to our previous research, we find that knowledge of a 
policy’s specifics has a very limited impact on individuals’ 
decisions. In only a few of our regressions did we find that 
knowledge of facts had an effect on vote choice. What we can 
conclude, however, is that knowledge of the status quo policy—
that same-sex couples were prohibited from marrying in all three 
states—never had an effect on an individual’s assessment of the 
ballot measure being considered. While our expectation is that 
knowledge of facts should influence individuals’ decisions, after 
numerous explorations of this hypothesis in this Article and in 
our previous research, we can only conclude that, when compared 
with cues, factual information has an even more limited effect on 
individuals’ decisions.62 
Examining an easy issue for voters to understand and make 
decisions leaves open the possibility that individuals simply do 
not need a cue to make a choice and, as a result, we should read 
our results as signs of encouragement that voters are making 
competent choices. We argue, however, that this is not what our 
results suggest. Overall, our results imply that scholars and the 
legal community should not assume that individuals use elite 
endorsements to inform their decisions at a high rate. 
Furthermore, we also find that knowledge of cues and facts is 
often quite low. Even though we examine an easy issue in 
same-sex marriage, our results here mimic the results in 
previous research, where we examine both easy and hard 
issues.63 In other words, we argue that our results are beginning 
to provide convergent validity to our conclusion that individuals 
simply do not use information from the campaign environment at 
a high rate.  
Our findings have several notable implications relevant to 
both legal scholars and practitioners. First, interpreting the will 
of the electorate may be more difficult than some might 
commonly assume. We show that knowledge of most ballot 
 
 62 Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7, at 305–16; Burnett 
& McCubbins, Sex and the Ballot Box, supra note 4, at 3, 5. 
 63 Burnett & McCubbins, Voters’ Limited Use of Endorsements, supra note 7, at 
1587–94. 
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measures is often quite low, demonstrating that most individuals 
are unaware of a measure’s specific attributes. If voters do not 
know a policy’s specifics, the courts are left with the unenviable 
task of guessing what the average voter knew when casting her 
choice. Additionally, we found that voters often knew little about 
the relevant endorsements. These endorsers are often the 
individuals who must explicate the logic behind supporting or 
opposing a specific policy. Thus, when voters are unaware of 
these endorsements, it raises concerns about turning to the 
actual supporting and opposing campaigns for guidance on 
interpreting what the voters’ intent was—which is a natural 
place for the courts to look, as these groups often compose at 
least one of the belligerents in a legal contest. 
Second, our results imply that the legal community and 
policymakers should be concerned about the kinds of questions 
that appear on the ballot. Moreover, in states similar to 
Washington that pose multiple ballot questions per cycle 
(e.g., California and Oregon), there should be some additional 
concern about the length of the ballot. In addition to the decades 
of research showing that voters lack basic foundational 
knowledge about politics, our findings show that knowledge of 
ballot measures is also quite low. As Downs argues, we suspect 
that most voters are simply too busy to spend the time and 
resources to acquire a deep understanding of the political world, 
let alone facts about ballot measures that will appear during the 
next election.64 Whereas Downs was less concerned about voter 
knowledge because cues, such as party labels, could convey 
immense amounts of information and substitute for knowledge, 
we show that knowledge of these cues is low—a problem that 
only compounds because cues are not available on the ballot 
directly in direct democracy contests, unlike many candidate 
contests. While some policies are largely symbolic and 
ends- rather than means-focused, and likely not difficult for most 
voters to cast a competent vote, many issues are complex and 
legally complicated propositions that require more than a “gut 
response” to make a reasoned decision.65 When ballots ask voters 
to consider these complicated policies, democracy is likely asking 
too much from the average voter. In some states, the number of 
complicated policies the voter must consider is astoundingly 
large. Policymakers and the legal community should begin 
thinking about how to institute controls and regulations that 
address these larger democratic concerns. 
 
 64 DOWNS, supra note 17, at 44–46. 
 65 Carmines & Stimson, supra note 11, at 78, 80 (referencing the prototypical “easy 
issues”). 
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Third, our findings show that the political landscape of direct 
democracy is one that is particularly susceptible to elite 
manipulation. With most voters knowing little about the ballot 
measures they consider on Election Day, it should be no surprise 
that political elites can shape the way in which the law is 
implemented, which is often contrary to the intent of the law.66 
In other words, when representative democracy interferes with 
the outcomes of direct democracy, voters are at an 
insurmountable disadvantage concerning their ability to monitor 
and enforce the outcomes of direct democracy.  
Elite interference may also begin well before Election Day. 
The results we present here, in conjunction with our previous 
research on the topic, show that voters know little about many 
kinds of ballot measures. This means that voters may rely 
disproportionately on the information that appears on the 
ballot—namely, the title and summary. With few exceptions, 
these titles and descriptions are written by a politically 
motivated figure.67 Indeed, it is commonplace to see several 
challenges to the proposed titles and summaries of ballot 
measures every election cycle, most claiming that the verbiage 
encourages a particular outcome through biased language. As 
Burnett and Kogan show, this kind of elite manipulation can be 
impressively effective with just a few word changes, even on 
“easy issues” such as same-sex marriage.68 To date, however, the 
task of writing these potentially manipulated titles and 
summaries remains largely in the hands of politically motivated 
individuals, and the courts consider challenges on a case-by-case 
basis. 
While the three issues we just outlined are important policy 
concerns, there may be no single solution to creating a better 
direct democracy framework. What is clear, however, is that 
direct democracy asks much from the average voter, but provides 
little in the way of informing voters about the potential impact of 
their choice in a way that is useful to them. To be sure, some 
measures have active campaigns that attempt to inform (albeit 
selectively) voters about their choices. In other cases, official 
 
 66 Previous research has documented that elected officials often fail to implement or 
only partially implement laws passed through direct democracy when it is not in their 
best interest. See Alan S. Gerber & Donald P. Green, The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone 
Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 653, 
661–62 (2000).  
 67 For example, this could be an attorney general or the measure’s proponents. 
 68 Craig M. Burnett & Vladimir Kogan, When Does Ballot Language Influence Voter 
Choices? Evidence from a Survey Experiment, 32 POL. COMM. 109, 109–11 (2015) 
(demonstrating, using experimental evidence, that elites may easily manipulate voters 
with very slight changes in titles and descriptions). 
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election literature outlines the issue at hand. But, most voters 
are busy, and largely unconcerned with their choices on Election 
Day beyond the top of the ballot contests (e.g., presidency, 
governorship). Several rounds of surveying individuals 
concerning what they know about direct democracy has only 
emphasized the veracity of this observation. 
One potential enhancement to the institution of direct 
democracy from the voter’s-eye-view is to improve the 
information environment on the ballot. Most voters appear to 
know little about the measures they are considering, and most 
measures are not as easy as a social policy choice such as same-
sex marriage. Thus, policymakers should endeavor to consider 
ways to improve the kinds of information that are available to 
voters at the point-of-decision (i.e., on the official ballot). As 
Burnett, Garrett, and McCubbins proposed in “The Dilemma of 
Direct Democracy,” we argue that endorsements on the actual 
ballot would be helpful to many voters.69 The challenge, however, 
is constructing a framework to select the endorsements that 
should be included and which ones should be excluded. Other 
kinds of information that would help improve decision making in 
direct democracy include, but are not limited to: clearly outlining 
the impact of a yes versus a no vote, longer descriptions of the 
measures, and the potential financial impact of a yes or no 
outcome (California already includes this information). While we 
cannot fully assess the feasibility or impact of any, or all, of these 
measures with the data we have, we suspect some of these 
additional pieces of information would drastically improve the 
quality of decisions in direct democracy elections for the average 
voter.  
 
 69 Burnett et al., Dilemma of Direct Democracy, supra note 7, at 317–24. 
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Appendix A 
 
North Carolina Demographics 
 
Survey 
2011 Census 
Estimates 
Age (Median) 39.9 37.7 
Income (Median) $25,001–$50,000 $45,570 
% High School Graduates, Age > 25 97.9 83.6 
% Female 76.6 51.3 
% White (Not Hispanic) 80.2 65 
% Black 12.6 22 
% Latino/Hispanic 2.2 8.6 
% Asian 2.2 2.3 
 
 
Minnesota Demographics 
  Survey 
2012 Census 
Estimates 
Age (Median) 49 36.9 
Income (Median) $50,001–$75,000 $58,476 
% High School Graduates, Age > 25 98.8 91.6 
% Female 63.4 50.3 
% White (Not Hispanic) 94 82.4 
% Black 1.1 5.5 
% Latino/Hispanic 0.9 4.9 
% Asian 2.2 4.4 
 
 
Washington Demographics 
  Survey 
2012 Census 
Estimates 
Age (Median) 49 37.3 
Income (Median) $50,001–$75,000 $58,890 
% High School Graduates, Age > 25 98.3 89.8 
% Female 64.7 50.1 
% White (Not Hispanic) 87.3 71.6 
% Black 1.7 3.9 
% Latino/Hispanic 2.1 11.7 
% Asian 5.4 7.7 
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Appendix B 
 
North Carolina 
Amendment 1 
1. Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
2. Do you happen to know if Governor Beverly Perdue supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
3. To the best of your knowledge, do you know if North Carolina 
law currently prohibits same-sex marriage? 
 
Minnesota 
Amendment 1 
1. Do you happen to know if President Barack Obama supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
2. Do you happen to know if Governor Mark Dayton supported, 
opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
3. Do you happen to know if Representative Michele Bachmann 
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
4. To the best of your knowledge, does Amendment 1 leave open 
the possibility of civil unions between same-sex couples? 
5. To the best of your knowledge, do you know if Minnesota law 
currently prohibits same-sex marriage? 
6. Do you happen to know if the Minnesota state legislature has 
considered constitutional amendments to outlaw same-sex 
marriage before the current proposal? 
 
Washington 
Referendum Measure No. 74 
1. Do you happen to know if Mark Bezos, CEO of Amazon.com, 
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
2. Do you happen to know if the Washington State Democrats 
supported, opposed, or took no position on Amendment 1? 
3. Do you happen to know if the National Organization for 
Marriage supported, opposed, or took no position on 
Amendment 1? 
4. To the best of your knowledge, as of today, do you know if same-
sex couples are allowed to marry in Washington State? 
5. If Referendum Measure No. 74 is confirmed—that is, voters 
support the referendum—do you happen to know what will 
happen to the majority of current domestic partnerships in the 
state? 
6. Do you happen to know if confirming Referendum 74 will 
require religious organizations that receive state funding to 
recognize and serve same-sex couples seeking to adopt a child or 
become foster parents? 
